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Analysis was conducted to understand ADNS, NNFE, and the goals of the 
enterprise system.  Following development of this background information and projecting 
how ADNS is likely to succeed in the NNFE framework, two fundamental research 
questions were addressed.  The first question:  Does the enterprise system reduce the 
discrepancies between PPBES and the acquisition decision process for both budgeting 
and defense asset acquisition? The second question is to what extent the discrepancies 
and resulting problems discovered during this research project be resolved to improve 
national defense budgeting within NNFE and asset acquisition decision effectiveness in 
DoD? 
Within the context of JCIDS, PPBES, and the acquisition system as a whole, 
some core issues have been identified that are obstacles to sound investment decisions.  
Problems identified include: 
• No common definition for capability 
• Lack of metrics for investment effectiveness 
• Stakeholders misalignment with enterprise 
• Competition between programs 
• Turnover and accountability 
Recent efforts have been undertaken by the Navy to organize within an enterprise 
construct in order to make smarter investment decisions, moving toward true capabilities 
based budgeting.  Programs within the PEO C4I/Space portfolio fall under the Naval 
Netwar FORCEnet Enterprise (NNFE), and the organization is working toward 
compliance with the Navy initiative. 
It is likely that programs such as ADNS will succeed within the NNFE 
framework.  However, NNFE at present does little to address the problems identified.  
NNFE will force stakeholders to focus on and develop a common capability framework, 
but this is only a partial enabler of capabilities based budgeting.  NNFE does not account 
for over-optimistic cost estimates, and does not address the root causes which include 
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misalignment of enterprise goals among stakeholders, lack of accountability for 
underperforming programs, and disconnects between JCIDS and PPBES.  Over time, 
NNFE may result in programs that are essentially "capabilities based," but this does not 
equate to better execution of programs or maximization of marginal value. 
A notional decision support model is discussed, but implementation is not feasible 
until underlying system deficiencies have been resolved.  More study is needed to 






Due to the changes made in defense acquisitions in 2003, the Navy and the Joint 
community are increasingly stressing the acquisition of transformational capabilities. 
However, many of the PEO C4I/Space’s supporting processes, particularly planning, 
programming, and budgeting, are still focused on individual programs or systems.  For 
this reason, PEO C4I/SPACE has experienced problems for improving advanced 
planning, programming, and budgeting efforts.  Their goal is to more effectively budget 
and obtain funding for cross-cutting capabilities within a portfolio of individual 
programs.  The Navy PEO C4I/SPACE recently expressed a desire for the ability to 
quantify improvement in war-fighting effectiveness to make investment decisions on a 
portfolio of programs that maximize the associated marginal value.1 
Analysis was conducted to understand ADNS, NNFE, and the goals of the 
enterprise system.  Following development of this background information and projecting 
how ADNS is likely to succeed in the NNFE framework, two fundamental research 
questions were addressed.  The first question:  Does the enterprise system reduce the 
discrepancies between PPBES and the acquisition decision process for both budgeting 
and defense asset acquisition? The second question is to what extent can the 
discrepancies and resulting problems discovered during this research project be resolved 
to improve national defense budgeting within NNFE and asset acquisition decision 
effectiveness in DoD? Finally, we present our conclusions from analysis and discuss the 
feasibility of a notional model to help PEO prioritize program decisions.   
The purpose of the project is to provide perspective on how problems identified 
might be addressed — in essence to describe and analyze options to be considered for 
problem resolution.  The intent is not to make recommendations for DoD action. 
However, to the extent feasible for the purpose of this student research project, 
hypothesized root causes of problems will be identified, and possible solutions will be 
                                                 
1 Teleconference with PEO C4I/Space representative.  April 21, 2006. 
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proposed and analyzed.  The fist chapter will discuss the background on the budget 
process and JCIDS.  The second chapter provides the background on the ADNS program.  
The third chapter discusses the new business model; NNFE and how it is suppose to 
operate.  The fourth chapter observes ADNS within the constraints of the enterprise 
model.  The fifth chapter provides analysis of ADNS with NNFE.  The sixth chapter 
discusses implications for capabilities based budgeting within the NNFE enterprise 
model.  The seventh chapter presents our conclusions along with our summary of 
findings, followed by suggested areas for further study.   
 
B. BACKGROUND ON BUDGET PROCESS AND JCIDS 
The continued Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is drastically increasing the 
annual Department of Defense (DoD) budget.  This increase is part of a cycle that can be 
traced throughout the history of the United States during times of war.  When historical 
military costs are analyzed, the peaks and valleys generally coincide with large military 
buildups directly attributable to periods of war.  Although it is easy to understand the 
causes of the trend, it is a little more difficult to distinguish the reasons to explain the 
continuous increase of DoD costs overall.  Most economists argue that this steady 
increase is due to inflation and other variables such as growth in Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) or Gross National Product (GNP).  These trends in cost growth typically 
encompass discretionary as well as non-discretionary governmental funds.  An example 
of growth in a discretionary fund is the cost and appropriations associated with the 
military and DoD.  An example of non-discretionary funds growth are the costs 
associated with Social Security or Medicare.   
When the historical costs are viewed objectively, the skeptic can make relative 
sense of the increases over the years and during times of war.  However, a type of 
funding that is not normally shown or separated in these graphs are the supplemental 
funds that are appropriated to DoD periodically.  These funds are made available by 
Congress to sustain military operations such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are 
separate from regular appropriations.  In other words, DoD budgets for and spends what 
is needed to continue to provide normal operations and purchases, while the supplemental 
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funds directly support operations that are not planned or budgeted in advance of the fiscal 
year.  For example, the DoD budget for 2007 is roughly $439 Billion, while 
supplementals are scheduled to be $50 Billion.  This brings the entire monies needed for 
DoD in 2007 to almost $500 Billion.2  Supplementals have been enacted by Congress to 
provide extra monies to support the GWOT.  These funds were first made available 
following the terrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001 (9/11).  Due to this 
attack, the subsequent war and military actions, a need developed for increased defense 
spending that was not previously anticipated or budgeted.   
The attacks on 9/11 and the entrance of a new era in warfare generated a new way 
of thinking within the Pentagon.  It was apparent that more defense dollars were needed 
to carry out the war on terror.  Increased spending would eventually create gaps and 
reductions in other areas of defense spending.  The plan for transformation by Secretary 
of Defense (SECDEF) Donald H. Rumsfeld was quickly distributed throughout DoD.  
Along with the idea of transformation came the entrance of a new way to conduct 
acquisitions in DoD.  This was the Joint Capabilities Integration & Development System 
(JCIDS).  The new concept was an attempt to reduce redundancy and duplication of 
effort, thereby making acquisition more efficient and reducing costs.  It would also focus 
attention on developing capabilities that can be employed and utilized jointly by all the 
services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines). 
  
C. THE JOINT CAPABILITIES INTEGRATION & DEVELOPMENT 
SYSTEM (JCIDS) 
The use of JCIDS as the tool for DoD acquisitions replaced the old requirements 
generation system and was implemented to help achieve Rumsfeld’s goal of transforming 
the DoD’s business practices and war fighting capabilities.  JCIDS was adopted in 2003 
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to increase efficiency, flexibility, creativity and innovation in 
the acquisition process.  The underlying principle of JCIDS was that it would enable the 
                                                 
2 Los Alamos Study Group, United States Military Spending, February 10, 2006 by Damon Hill and 
Greg Mello, 
http://72.14.209.104/search?q=cache:Xle90j9yOd0J:www.lasg.org/USMilitarySpending.pdf+DoD+supple
mental+for+2007&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=4 (October 2006). 
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services to define their capability needs while still focusing on national strategy.  This 
system was designed to force early involvement of all participants (military and 
contractors) in defining and incrementally redefining capabilities to ensure that any 
capability gap was identified and an agreement for the solution was made.3  The DoD 
uses the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) along with the Functional 
Capabilities Board (FCB) to assess and determine where capability gaps exist.  These 
committees also aid in the decision-making process that determines which programs to 
fund that will accurately eliminate those identified gaps.  The appeal of JCIDS was that it 
would formulate top-down requirements generation.  This process would be used in 
conjunction with the formal defense acquisition process and the Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES).  This transformation would focus on better 
and more efficient products.  Prior to JCIDS, the defense acquisition process was driven 
from the bottom-up and was not focused on a jointly functioning military.  The process 
was effectively "program centric."   
The JCIDS process would flow from the national military strategy and would be 
pushed down to the joint vision, then on to the joint concept of operations, then to the 
joint concepts integrated architecture, and finally ends with the identification of joint 
capabilities.  This process would ensure all capabilities are jointly born.  Within the 
process there are various analyses to be conducted which are in place to force improved 
efficiency.  These are the functional area analysis, functional needs analysis, functional 
solutions analysis, and the post independent analysis—all of which are responsible to 
verify joint capabilities.  A major issue with the JCIDS process is the overlap it has with 
PPBES.  While PPBES is calendar driven, JCIDS is event driven.  The combination of 
these two processes tends to result in failure with meeting the desired outcome.  To 
reduce these failures, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and 
Logistics (USD AT&L) recommends that the government attempt to hold personnel 
accountable.4  While this is common in the private sector business market, it is not so 
                                                 
3 US DoD: DoD receives new capabilities development system. (2003). M2 Presswire, 1. 
4 2006 Acquisition Symposium Lecture.  May 17, 2006.  Honorable Kenneth J. Krieg, USD (AT&L) 
Lecture. 
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common within the government acquisitions process.  Furthermore, the analyses that 
monitor effectiveness described above normally take 12 to 18 months.  Though the 
results may be effective, the time lag results in inefficiency.  Government acquisitions 
can evolve and overcome these efficiencies, but doing so requires the following:  
investment meetings with all responsible participants, accountability for failures, capital 
to fund these interactions, and firmly established achievable requirements.5  
 
D. THE ACQUISITION PROCESS  
The acquisition process is broken down into schedules and milestone events that 
are monitored by the acquisition chain of authority.  The official chain of authority is the 
Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE), the Component Acquisition Executive (CAE), the 
Program Executive Officer (PEO), and finally the Program Manager (PM).6  The 
particular authority over a given program depends on the level of significance of that 
individual program.  This is usually governed by the dollar amount or cost of the program 
being monitored.  For example, three distinct milestone decisions exist within the 
acquisition framework.  They are milestone decision authority (MDA) A, B, and C, each 
of which must be approved before a program can advance to the next stage of 
development.  The acquisition process includes the following stages:  concept refinement, 
milestone A decision, technology development, milestone B decision, system 
development and demonstration, milestone C decision, production and deployment, and 
finally operations and support – to include disposal.  The amount of oversight is the result 
of the milestone review process, which is fundamental to the program management 
model preferred by Congress and DoD.  By eliminating programs that do not meet the 
criteria set by the MDA, the large percentages of costs on programs that are not justified 
will be eliminated.7 
                                                 
5 2006 Acquisition Symposium Lecture.  May 17, 2006.  Honorable Kenneth J. Krieg, USD (AT&L) 
Lecture. 
6 DoDD 5000.1, May 12, 2003.  http://www.dau.mil/ (November 2006). 
7 Defense Acquisition Guidebook, Chapter 3.1.2. Lifecycle Cost Categories and Program Phases. 
December 16, 2004. http://www.dau.mil/ (October 2006). 
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E. PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING AND EXECUTION 
SYSTEM (PPBES) 
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) was renamed to include 
Execution (PPBES) in 2003 to coincide with the transformation of JCIDS.  The PPBES 
process allows for systematic multi-service budgeting within DoD to formulate the 
President’s budget.  The President’s budget proposal is submitted to Congress for the 
appropriation of funds.  It is important to note that Congress has the authority to modify 
the proposed budget as deemed necessary.  For example, in the 2007 budget proposal, the 
President requested a 2.2 percent pay raise for the military, but Congress enacted a 2.7 
percent pay increase.8  This is an important event that illustrates the role of politics within 
the budget process, especially considering that 2006 is an election year. Unlikely 
considerations in this process are where this extra 0.5 percent will come from or what 
program will lose funding to account for the pay increase. 
The PPBES process consists of four phases.  First is the Planning phase.  The 
planning phase begins with the overarching National Security Strategy (NSS) which is 
established by federal agencies that determine possible threats to national security.9  This 
strategy alerts the military service commanders to the goal or objectives set out by the 
President and his administration.  It is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) 
who collects input from the military services and addresses which joint capabilities will 
meet the NSS objectives.  This information is passed on to the SECDEF who then 
formulates the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and the Future Year Defense Plan 
(FYDP).10 
Next is the Programming phase which uses the DPG and the FYDP to provide 
guidance for preparing a Program Objectives Memorandum (POM).  The purpose of the 
POM is for each military service to determine what funds will be needed for the FYDP in 
                                                 
8 House committee approves civilian-military pay parity. June 7, 2006, by Karen Rutzick. 
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0606/060706r1.htm (October 2006) 
9 J. L. McCaffery & L. R. Jones, (2004). Budgeting and financial management for national defense. 
Greenwich: Information Age Publishing.  
10 J. L. McCaffery & L. R. Jones, (2004). Budgeting and financial management for national defense. 
Greenwich: Information Age Publishing. 
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order to achieve the NSS.  This is accomplished by breaking down the capabilities 
needed to achieve the NSS to each individual capability that encompasses the whole.  In 
other words, the service POM is made up of many individual POMs.  Then each service 
POM is carefully reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to verify compliance with 
the DPG and overall capability effectiveness.11  
The Budgeting phase is based on the selected programs from each service POM 
and is then calculated to determine the entire cost.  This cost is combined to form the 
Budget Estimate Submission (BES) and is put into action during the POM cycle which is 
implemented during even numbered years.  For example, the basic FYDP encompasses 
six fiscal years while the BES and POM cover the even numbered years during the 
FYDP.  The odd numbered years during the FYDP are used for evaluation and, if 
necessary, for adjusting the planned budget to meet the NSS. If major issues are 
identified, each submitting service component will address the stated issue.  If no 
conclusion is reached, the SECDEF or Office of the SECDEF Comptroller will make the 
final decision regarding the issue.  The final budget is then sent to the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), which reviews and submits to the President.  The 
President then reviews and sends the proposed budget to Congress for appropriation.12 
The final phase in PPBES is execution.  During the execution of the budget, 
approval must be made by Congress to spend the appropriated monies on programs that 
have been authorized.  This authorization breaks down when the spending will occur, for 
example by month or quarter.13  The House and Senate Arms Services Committee 
(HASC & SASC) authorizes expenditures.  The House and Senate Appropriations 
Committee (HAC & SAC) appropriates funds to be spent.  There are severe criminal and 
civil penalties (heavy fines and imprisonment) for violating the authorizations and  
 
                                                 
11 J. L. McCaffery & L. R. Jones, (2004). Budgeting and financial management for national defense. 
Greenwich: Information Age Publishing. 
12 J. L. McCaffery & L. R. Jones, (2004). Budgeting and financial management for national defense. 
Greenwich: Information Age Publishing..  
13 J. L. McCaffery & L. R. Jones, (2004). Budgeting and financial management for national defense. 
Greenwich: Information Age Publishing. 
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appropriations, which include Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA) violations.  Therefore, each 
PM or PEO must ensure compliance of their spending to avoid any violation or 
inefficiency.   
To be a successful or effective PM or PEO within the boundaries of the JCIDS 
process requires a full understanding of the game you are playing.  Furthermore, a PM or 
PEO must anticipate what is or will be required at the top levels of government in order 
to fund his/her program or group of programs.  For example, the phrase “joint capability” 
is the key phrase that must be ingrained in the submission for funding for a new program.  
However, there is a problem when the PM is attempting to compete for funds with a 
program that is not new nor has been developed with joint capabilities in mind.  Another 
problem lies within the term “capability”.  What capability means to a software designer 
is very different than what capability means to a foot soldier in Iraq.  The acquisition 
process requires full interaction of these two customers to provide the best solution to a 
given problem.  In today’s JCIDS process, a successful end product requires a close 
interaction of user and contractor who often have very different interpretations of 
capability. 
 
F. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
In the 2006 Acquisition Symposium in Monterey, California, the Honorable 
Kenneth J. Krieg, USD AT&L, addressed the capability issue.  Mr. Krieg stated that the 
DoD acquisitions community faces three challenges in the future.  One of those 
challenges is establishing a universal definition of the term “capability.”  This problem 
stems from the varying definitions throughout the chain of command.  For instance, the 
PEO may often try to build a program that he/she believes meet a certain capability, but 
this capability may not appease decision makers at the Pentagon.  The result is that when 
this issue surfaces the dilemma is extended out in time to be solved at a later date.14  The 
truth is that the issue is never really resolved and money and energy are wasted. 
                                                 
14 2006 Acquisition Symposium Lecture.  May 17, 2006.  Honorable Kenneth J. Krieg, USD (AT&L) 
Lecture. 
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The problem of not having a universal definition of capability is also present with 
regard to the contractors who support military acquisitions.  A contractor cannot design 
or build an item or weapon without knowing what it needs to accomplish.  According to a 
representative of a large U.S. military contracting company, it is imperative that the 
services discuss operational capabilities and include industry partners in those 
discussions.15  Therefore, it is vital that all members of the acquisition community agree 
upon a desired level of the capability being targeted.  This matter becomes more complex 
when a PM’s job is to make a portion of the overall end product.  How does this PM 
address the capability of his/her portion? Can he/she fight for this program’s portion of 
the funding? This is where a comprehensive understanding of the importance of each 
program in relation to the success of the entire system is crucial.  This is especially 
significant in dealing with system programs, where a Family of Systems (FOS) or System 
of Systems (SOS) is developed from many separate systems.  Each system has its own 
PM and funding, but one cannot function without the other, therefore each are of equal 
value.   
 
G. PEO C4I/SPACE PROGRAMS 
In an effort to overcome this problem, the Program Executive Officer for 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence and Space (PEO 
C4I/SPACE) has implemented a joint-working relationship with the Air Force, Army and 
other joint agencies in support of joint development.16  By working with other services, 
the task of defining the desired capability is better achieved.  As stated earlier, the 
development of FOS or SOS is extremely complex.  Therefore, this joint interaction early 
in the process helps to overcome future unexpected issues.  One such success is Common 
Link Integration Processing (CLIP).  CLIP is a transformational capability that will 
provide tactical networking.  This program is a joint Air Force and Navy program 
                                                 
15 Discussion, understanding capabilities key for sea basing, official says. (2006). Defense Daily, 
229(12), 1. 
16 Military Information Technology Online Archives, Interview with Dennis M. Bauman, Program 
Executive Officer, C4I & Space, December 22, 2004. Bauman was interviewed by MIT Editor Harrison 
Donnelly. http://www.military-information-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=758 (October 2006). 
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between PEO C4I/Space and the Air Force Electronic Systems Command.  The Army is 
also monitoring the effort and may soon join as a full member.17 
Although JCIDS is a top-down requirements process, it is still important for all 
commanders to be involved and develop cost-effective ways to achieve the stated 
objectives.  If not, funds will not be issued to the command and the objective will be 
given to a more capable one.  This is an ongoing struggle and fight to receive resources 
from a limited source of funds.  To overcome this obstacle and ensure funding, the PEO 
C4I/Space has reorganized its organization to achieve three objectives:  First, to focus on 
the delivery of capabilities instead of individual systems; next, to have a larger role in the 
C4I systems for new construction platforms to promote interoperability and 
sustainability; and finally, to achieve increased organizational efficiencies.18   
Although these organizational changes seem effective on the surface, they do not 
force existing programs to adapt and change to this architecture.  The PEO C4I/Space is 
responsible for many individual programs, each with their respective PM, some of which 
have been in existence for more than ten years.  These programs were not developed 
jointly nor do they have any joint capacity, but are still required in order to meet the 
specific missions of the Navy.  These programs are in bitter competition with newer 
programs that are joint in nature.  In essence, the problem is a matter of prioritizing which 
programs to fund.  This causes PMs to waste valuable time and resources in an effort to 
sustain their program.  For instance, the PM for Automated Digital Network System 
(ADNS) has been incrementally installing this system on Navy ships since the 1990s  
{ADNS will be explained in greater detail as it will be used as a “case study” analysis for 
the new enterprise system}.  Incremental development is the process of adding 
technology to selected ships as the technology becomes available.  The ADNS program 
                                                 
17 Military Information Technology Online Archives, Interview with Dennis M. Bauman, Program 
Executive Officer, C4I & Space, December 22, 2004. Bauman was interviewed by MIT Editor Harrison 
Donnelly. http://www.military-information-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=758 (October 2006). 
18 Military Information Technology Online Archives, Interview with Dennis M. Bauman, Program 
Executive Officer, C4I & Space, December 22, 2004. Bauman was interviewed by MIT Editor Harrison 
Donnelly. http://www.military-information-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=758 (October 2006). 
 13
historically benefits the Navy, but must compete in an acquisition process where joint 
operability and capabilities are the keys to funding.19   
Currently, PEO C4I/Space is developing a steady state of new systems that are 
attempting to fill a capability gap.  The desired outcome is the determination of a war-
fighting capability to drive system advances, which is how JCIDS is designed to operate.  
It is evident that there is an issue with the JCIDS process regarding existing systems 
technology.  The underlying issue is the attempt to accurately and effectively prioritize 
and manage these programs.  Also, in the fight for funds, the PM must submit his/her 
POM that will be in competition with the joint programs.  If these existing programs lose 
the fight, the program may be terminated.  This could result in millions of dollars of spent 
funds without receiving any benefit or substantial contribution to the military.  It is 
important to note that the elimination of a program could mean the termination of some 
civilian employees and most certainly the termination of the PM.  This result adds to the 
competition for the funding of programs.  According to a PM under the PEO C4I/Space, 
any and all necessary actions will be taken to ensure the survival of a program.20  It is 
clear that in the current acquisition environment, program managers are motivated to 
perpetuate their programs without regard to the enterprise as a whole. 
Another variable in the complex process that adds to inefficiency is the Resource 
Officer (RO).  The RO is a representative whose role is to manage the funds authorized 
and to allocate those funds to the respective programs.  The main problem is that in most 
instances the RO is someone new to the government acquisition process and does not 
understand the PPBES, JCIDS, or acquisition systems.  The RO relies on the PM to 
educate them on the processes to adequately perform their job.  In turn, the PEO and each 
PM rely tremendously on this individual to keep their funding in order.  It typically takes 
a year of more for the RO to learn the job.  This is extremely inefficient, especially when 
the average RO position is rotated about every two years.  According to one PM under 
                                                 
19 Teleconference with PEO C4I/Space representative.  April 28, 2006. 
20 Teleconference with PEO C4I/Space representative.  May 2, 2006. 
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PEO C4I/Space, the average RO produces about three to six months worth of valued 
work performance before he/she moves on to another job.21 
 
H. IMPLEMENTATION OF NNFE 
The PEO C4I/Space is currently engaged in actions that may resolve some of the 
issues described above, one of which is transition to the Naval NETWAR FORCEnet 
Enterprise (NNFE).  NNFE is a collaborative effort that includes NETWARCOM as the 
requirements lead, OPNAV (N6F) as the resource sponsor and TEAM SPAWAR 
(including PEO C4I/Space, PEO Space Systems and PEO Enterprise Information 
Systems) as the provider of capability. 
This process will include the use of the above mentioned commands, which make 
up the Navy Enterprise Triad, to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of each in 
order to collectively enhance the delivery of network centric operations to the fleet and 
the Joint war-fighter.22  The use of the Navy Enterprise Triad will also force a common 
definition for the term ‘capability’.  This will bring the architecture models into a 
common vocabulary and allow for standardization.  This standardization will provide a 
tool to measure success from one POM year to the next.  Currently, no such models 
measure success at this level of the acquisition process.   
Currently, there are no metrics in place for measuring effectiveness from one 
POM cycle to the next; the only measurement of performance is whether the program got 
funded or not.  For example, during the POM 2008 (POM 08) cycle, representatives from 
PEO C4I/Space literally flew to Washington, D.C. and camped at the Financial 
Management and Budget (FMB) office to fight for funding.  This was done because it 
was rumored that PEO C4I/Space was going to have funds cut in order to support other 
programs.  Due to the C4I/Space representatives’ presence and hounding of the FMB 
officials, funding was not cut.  This persistence may have succeeded in continued 
funding, but what programs other than PEO C4I/Space were not funded and why not? 
                                                 
21 Teleconference with PEO C4I/Space representative.  May 2, 2006. 
22 Teleconference with PEO C4I/Space representative.  April 28, 2006. 
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According to a representative from PEO C4I/Space, they were successful in securing 
their funds solely because of their physical presence in the FMB office and annoying the 
officials.23  If this is the case, it is easy to see how the human factor can be successful 
outside the boundaries of the official JCIDS process.  The goal of this research is to aid in 
the development of strategies and to create a management matrix based on historical 
POMs, for PEO C4I/Space to achieve more successful POMs in the future.  The 
following paragraphs identify the problems that will be researched and is the formal 
proposal for our MBA project. 
Analysis was conducted to understand ADNS, NNFE, and the goals of the 
enterprise system.  Research was qualitative in nature and was based on basic principles 
from the fields of program management, organizational behavior, strategic management, 
and corporate best practices.  The business environment was analyzed to determine 
impacts to investment decisions.  Stakeholder analysis was also performed, focusing on 
incentive structures in place for key stakeholders in the acquisition process. 
With these qualifications we attempt to address the question, given the current 
system, customer requirements, a resource constrained environment, and organizational 
inertia, of whether it is possible for the PEO to make smarter investment decisions and 
prioritize programs to provide capability more effectively through the POM process. 
 
I. SUMMARY 
The ultimate goal for PEO C4I/SPACE is to effectively budget and obtain funding 
for cross-cutting capabilities within a portfolio of individual, diverse programs.  The 
problem will be first approached by analysis of current acquisition processes, 
organizations, and customers.  Programs that operate within the milestone driven JCIDS 
receive funding through the calendar driven PPBES.  Individual programs operate at 
different phases of the JCIDS process, largely operating independently from one another, 
and in some cases provide redundant capabilities.  This phenomenon was supposed to be 
eliminated with the emergence of JCIDS.  The key element to decision making in the 
                                                 
23 Teleconference with PEO C4I/Space representative.  May 2, 2006. 
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DoD financial resource system is the POM process.  This process is employed at all 
levels of DoD to resource defense asset acquisition—from the DAE to the PM.  In the 
war-fighter user community, a recent re-organization of the OPNAV Staff will be 
analyzed to identify potential impacts on both PPBES and POM input and acquisition 
decision making.  Past problems encountered by PEO C4I/SPACE in the POM process 
will be analyzed and characterized according to root causes of problems that result from 
discrepancies between PPBES and acquisition decision processes. This leads into a case 
study of ADNS and how it is projected to succeed within NNFE. 
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II. AUTOMATED DIGITAL NETWORK SYSTEM 
A. PROGRAM BACKGROUND 
Automated Digital Network System (ADNS) is one of the programs that make up 
the portfolio of programs of the Program Executive Officer for Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Intelligence and Space (PEO C4I/SPACE).  ADNS is 
coded PMW160 (Networks, Information Assurance and Enterprise Services Program 
Office).  It is part of the Integrated Shipboard Network System (ISNS) and serves as the 
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) network link between ships, aircraft, and 
ground suites. 
In keeping with the Navy’s Net-centric Warfare concept, ADNS is the 
communication force multiplier which adapts shipboard Local Area Networks (LAN) 
communication requirements to an “ADNS optimized satellite constellation”.   
ADNS is the tactical wide area network (WAN) for Navy internet protocol (IP) 
network operations, which includes SIPRnet (classified networks), NIPRnet (unclassified 
networks), and Non-U.S. LANs.  The key enabler for developing FORCEnet capabilities 
which depend upon a robust, dynamic, adaptable, flexible, adjustable, survivable, secure, 
and reconfigurable communications infrastructure.24   
ADNS is the Navy key enabler that allows for Joint Concept for Global 
Information Grid (GIG) Network Centric Operations and Joint Navy Operating Concept 
(JNOC) requirements to be achieved.25   
ADNS is dependent upon governing direction and guidance as well as other 
programs: 
• N6/N7 FORCEnet Requirements/Capabilities and Compliance Policy {27 
May 2005} 
• Net-Centric Enterprise Solutions for Interoperability (NESI) Guidance 
• Net-Centric Enterprise Services (NCES) Guidance 
                                                 
24 Net-Centric Warfare (N71) POM=08 Program Review, 1 December 2005. N71C118. 
25 Net-Centric Warfare (N71) POM=08 Program Review, 1 December 2005. N71C118. 
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• GIG NetOps CONOPS (Concept of Operations) 
• GIG Information Assurance Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) 
• GIG Mission Area ICD 
• Message traffic highlighting 7th Fleet’s top 10 C4I priorities (specifically 
ADNS} 
• Navy IPv6 (Internet Protocol version 6) Transition Plan Version 1.2 which 
establishes technical strategy guidelines on architecture, standards, and 
implementation engineering. 
• DoD IPv6 Transition Plan Version 1.0 guidance provided to component 
services.26 
ADNS is not only dependent on other programs, but it is also a building block on 
which other capabilities and systems rely to meet stated objectives.  ADNS provides the 
communications infrastructure for Navy units (Ships, Subs, and Aircraft) to pass and 
share IP data.  ADNS also enables joint, allied, and Coalition interoperability by 
providing this infrastructure.  This allows direct voice to these end users, provides quality 
of service to ensure accuracy, and provides time sensitive strike, surveillance, operational 
pictures, and intelligence to support the war-fighter.27 
The program profile of ADNS for Program Review (PR) 07 showed Future Year 
Defense Plan (FYDP) Fiscal Year (FY) 08-13 as $28.221M (million) for Research, 
Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E); $244.675M for Other Procurement Navy 
(OPN)/Aircraft Procurement Navy (APN)/Weapons Procurement Navy (WPN); and 
$45.360M for Operations and Maintenance Navy (OMN).  The normal unit cost range for 
ADNS is $112,000 to $500,000 and nominal installation cost range is $30,000 to 
$505,000.  The following chart indicates the costs associated with ADNS per category 
thru FY13. 
                                                 
26 Net-Centric Warfare (N71) POM=08 Program Review, 1 December 2005. N71C118. 
27 Net-Centric Warfare (N71) POM=08 Program Review, 1 December 2005. N71C118. 
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P/E LI/RDTE APPN DESCRIPTION FY08
0204163N 3050-00 OPN Ship Comm Auto 34.2
0204163N 3050-05 OPN Ship Comm Auto 14.4
0204163N 00725 RDTE Fleet Telecom 4.4
0204163N 4A6M OMN ADNS 6.5
59.6
FY08 Actual Cost Structure
Cost Category RDTEN OMN WPN OPN SCN
Product Develop 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Product Procure 1.2 0.0 0.0 19.8 0.0
Installation 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.9 0.0
Product 2.2 0.0 0.0 33.7 0.0
Software 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Training 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.2 0.0
Integ Log Support 0.2 2.3 0.0 2.4 0.0
Support 0.2 4.3 0.0 3.6 0.0
Development Test 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OT/OPEVAL 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
T & E 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Eng Support 0.7 0.7 0.0 5.7 0.0
Mgmt Support 0.3 0.5 0.0 4.2 0.0
Travel 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.5 0.0
Management 1.0 2.2 0.0 11.3 0.0















$  M  
$ 10 M  
$ 20 M  
$ 30 M  
$ 40 M  
$ 50 M  
$ 60 M  
$ 70 M  
OMN 6.326 6.332 5.523 6.489 7.468 7.591 7.773 7.936 8.103
OPN 42.218 24.231 19.426 48.625 39.668 30.289 41.161 42.025 42.908
MPN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RDTEN 0.419 6.432 5.972 4.443 4.655 4.687 4.709 4.808 4.909









After:  Brief:  Net-Centric Warfare (N-71) POM-08 Program Review//Automated Digital Network 
System (ADNS)//Robert Bradley/NC71C118, 1 December 2005. 
Figure 1.   Automated Digital Network System (ADNS) Costs 
 
During the Congressional review of the proposed budget in 2006, a budget for 
$254.0M was requested for procurement of ADNS and Communication Automation.  It is 
important to note that the House Armed Service Committee (HASC) and the Senate 
Armed Service Committee (SASC) authorize spending.  While the House Appropriations 
Committee (HAC) and Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) actually control how 
funds are dispersed.  The following chart shows that HAC made a mark and 
recommended a reduction of $52M to provide a lower rate of growth more in line with 
pushing funds to out years.   
 20
 
After:  Brief:  Net-Centric Warfare (N-71) POM-08 Program Review//Automated Digital Network 
System (ADNS)//Robert Bradley/NC71C118, 1 December 2005. 
Figure 2.   Congressional Action Proposed Budget 2006 
 
This problem indicates just the tip of the iceberg.  By making reductions in other 
programs such as SAC recommendation of a reduction of $15M to Tactical Switching, 
this mark will impact ADNS because it is part of the SCI Network and ISNS.  These 
examples illustrate how interconnected these programs are and that a solitary cut can 
have lasting effects on multiple programs.  Therefore, it is vital to the program for each 
mark to be analyzed and a reclama issued back to FMB or OSD to educate those 
financially responsible of the significance of any budget cuts. 
ADNS is incrementally funded.  This reduces the costs of trying to outfit every 
Navy platform that requires ADNS in one fiscal year.  Also, this allows for spiral 
development to be implemented in the RDTE phase, which allows for the latest and 
greatest variant to be installed of the given platform during that particular year.  ADNS is 
currently budgeting for Increment III.  The Chief of Naval Operation’s (CNO) vision 
includes a 1000 ship Navy and a global network for maritime security.  N6, or Navy 
Communications, play a huge role in the CNO’s vision.  N6 will accomplish their tasks 
through assured communications/networking and effective/efficient end-to-end delivery.  
N6 will be responsible for connecting the 1000 ship Navy and providing knowledge on 
demand.28  Increment III of ADNS will be the link that ensures that the CNO’s vision is 
met and the FORCEnet challenge is overcome.   
“FORCEnet is defined as the operational construct and architectural framework 
for Naval Warfare in the information age, integrating warriors, sensors, command and 
control, platforms and weapons, into a networked, distributed force.”29   
                                                 
28Brief:  POM-08 N6 Sponsor Program Proposal, Admiral Mullen 19 April 2006. 
29Brief:  POM-08 N6 Sponsor Program Proposal, Admiral Mullen 19 April 2006. 
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The following charts illustrate the program schedule and increment installations 
of ADNS thru FY13.   
Program Schedule
(Baseline / Actual)
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After:  Brief:  Net-Centric Warfare (N-71) POM-08 Program Review//Automated Digital Network 
System (ADNS)//Robert Bradley/NC71C118, 1 December 2005. 













Program Current Fielding Plan
PRIOR 
YEARS
FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 TO 
COMPLETE
AGF        P 2 Continuing
I 2 Continuing
AOE         P 8 Continuing
I 8 Continuing
AS              P 2 1 1 1 Continuing
I 2 1 1 1 Continuing
ARS          P 4 Continuing
I 4 Continuing
CG            P 41 3 3 6 4 5 3 5 2 Continuing
I 32 10 5 6 0 4 5 7 3 Continuing
CV              P 2 Continuing
I 2 Continuing
CVN          P 13 7 3 2 4 3 1 Continuing
I 12 5 5 2 2 3 4 Continuing
DD            P 19 Continuing
I 19 Continuing
DDG      P 88 8 3 9 18 8 15 14 5 Continuing
I 65 23 13 9 6 13 19 11 11 Continuing
FFG          P 36 3 2 18  4 1 Continuing
I 31 5 5 9 9 3 2 Continuing
LCC           P 3 2 1 Continuing
I 2 2 1  1 Continuing
PLATFORM
EQUIPMENT NAME: ADNS I, II, IIa, III
 
After:  Brief:  Net-Centric Warfare (N-71) POM-08 Program Review//Automated Digital Network 
System (ADNS)//Robert Bradley/NC71C118, 1 December 2005. 







FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 TO 
COMPLETE
LHA           P 7 3 1  1 Continuing
I 7 2 1 1  1 Continuing
LHD          P 12 6 2 2 2 2 4 1 Continuing
I 11 4 4 3 3 4 2 Continuing
LPD      P 19 1 1 2 1  1 3 Continuing
I 18 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 Continuing
LSD        P 21 8 1 1 1 4 4 2 Continuing
I 20 7 3 1 4 3 4 Continuing
MCM       P 14 1 5  12 2 Continuing
I 14 1 2 3 9 5 Continuing
MHC         P 8 Continuing
I 8 Continuing
WHEC      P  Continuing
I  Continuing
SSN-688    P 52 Continuing
     I 52 Continuing
SSN-21    P 3 Continuing
I 3 Continuing
SSBN       P 2 Continuing
I 2 Continuing
TOTAL P 355 45 22 41 37 20 25 37 7
I 313 64 37 34 32 34 29 28 18
PLATFORM
Program Current Fielding Plan
EQUIPMENT NAME: ADNS I, II, IIa, III
 
After:  Brief:  Net-Centric Warfare (N-71) POM-08 Program Review//Automated Digital Network 
System (ADNS)//Robert Bradley/NC71C118, 1 December 2005. 
Figure 5.   ADNS Fielding Plan (Part B) 
 
The development strategy of ADNS is end-to-end capability and is accomplished 
through incremental design as mentioned previously.  As described above, ADNS is 
currently in the process of designing increment III.  Increment I and II were designed, 
developed, and built by the government.  Increment III is currently being designed and 
developed by contractors which are divided into two engineering development models 
and two shore demonstration systems.30  Once this increment is budgeted and the 
contractor tests these systems, the Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) will begin.  After 
successful evaluations of the LRIP and all associated issues or problems are corrected, 
then full rate production will commence.  This is a lengthy and time consuming process, 
but this process increases the probability of success for a program.  Therefore, all 
programs evolve in a similar fashion.  The chart below helps to visualize the history of 
ADNS and its associated increments.  
                                                 
30Brief:  Program Executive Office C4I and Space, PMW160.  ADNS INC III ACT 10 July 2006, 
CDR Scott Heller. 
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After:  Brief:  Program Executive Office C4I and Space, PMW160.  ADNS INC III ACT 10 July 2006, 
CDR Scott Heller. 
Figure 6.   Incremental Development of ADNS 
 
As stated earlier, ADNS is one program that comprises the portfolio of programs 
that is managed by the PEO for C4I and Space.  There are many stakeholders involved 
with ADNS, however the key ones are the Program Executive Officer (PEO), the 
Program Manager (PM), and the Assistant Program Manager (APM).  To get ADNS 
through Increment III, the JCIDS process must be completed.  This includes Concept 
Refinement, Technology Development, System Development and Demonstration, 
Production and Deployment, Operations and Support, and finally disposal.  Before this 
Increment can pass from one stage to the next, it must meet certain predetermined 
criteria.  This is called the Milestone Decision.  The Milestone Decision is determined by 
the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) who verifies that all conditions have been met 
prior to advancing to the next stage of development.  ADNS is an ACAT III program; 
therefore the MDA is the PEO himself. (For more details on acquisition processes refer to 
Chapter I).   
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One of the major problems confronting the key stakeholders in ADNS has been 
and most likely will continue to be the annual budget issues that take arise.  These 
differences of opinions not only pit PM against PM but also totally different 
acquisitionists as well.  The recent budget deficits and the war on terrorism have added to 
the strains put on financing programs within DoD.  Following the attacks of September 
11, 2001, Congress has supplied supplemental funds to the annual budgets to cover the 
costs that were not previously budgeted in the war on terror.  It is widely believed that 
2006 will be the last year to receive supplemental funding.  All costs associated with the 
war on terror will come from each individual service’s annual budget.  This will create 
more of a scramble for PEOs and PMs to prioritize which programs to fund.  This fight 
over funding is vital to a system or program.  The loss of a program degrades capabilities 
and costs many people their jobs.  Therefore, any and all tricks will be used to ensure 
funding; this includes contacting Congressmen and Senators to act on one’s behalf.  A 
specific example was provided that further illustrates this point.   
Congress, FMB, and OSD have historically made cuts against the proposed 
budgets submitted by each service.  Due to the strain of not enough money to fund 
everything that is requested, a new approach must be undertaken.  This process is the 
business model for DoD in the budgeting process.  This idea was developed by Vice 
Admiral Crenshaw, N8, who has developed the Enterprise system.  ADNS is part of the 
Navy NETWAR FORCEnet Enterprise (NNFE) which will be used to help guide the 
budget process for PEO C4I & Space in the future.  The chart below shows the 
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After:  Brief:  Program Executive Office C4I and Space, PMW160.  ADNS INC III ACT 10 July 2006, 
CDR Scott Heller. 
Figure 7.   Acquisition Using the Business Approach 
 
B. SUMMARY 
ADNS is an older program that historically has been strictly Navy driven.  These 
prior increments have not had any reason to look beyond benefiting the Navy.  Now with 
the 2003 emergence of JCIDS; it is becoming more and more difficult for a program to 
survive without having jointness in mind.  This is not to say that some programs do not 
have service specific functions and are still funded, it is merely much more difficult.  
This point stresses the importance that the PEO and other stakeholders must place on the 
process in order to stay on track to meet the CNO’s strategic vision. This begs the 
question of how ADNS will succeed within NNFE, which is analyzed in the next section. 
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III. NAVY NETWAR FORCENET ENTERPRISE (NNFE) 
A. NNFE BACKGROUND 
Navy NETWAR FORCEnet Enterprise or NNFE is a concept that has been 
introduced to the Navy budgeting process or PPBES.  The Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations Integration of Capabilities and Resources (OPNAV N8) is developing an 
enterprise process to aid DoD budgeters develop a more public sector business model 
than the current historical bureaucratic process in the U.S. DoD. This operating concept 
divides the warfare enterprises into five areas:  The Naval Air Enterprise (NAE), the 
Surface Warfare Enterprise (SWE), the Under Sea Enterprise (USE), the Navy NETWAR 
FORCEnet Enterprise (NNFE), and the Navy Expeditionary Combat Enterprise 
(NECE).31   
One of the goals of this new process is to cut down on the end-of-year spending 
that normally takes place just because there is left-over unspent funds.  This spending has 
historically been conducted without any true need; it is merely money that must be spent 
to prevent a decrease in funds for the following year.  This new approach will facilitate a 
corporate atmosphere with the hopes of reducing unnecessary spending.  In essence, 
everyone is on the same team with the same financial goals, much like a business in 
concentrating on the end-of-year bottom-line.  This process fits into what statisticians and 
business professionals refer to as Lean Six Sigma.   
Lean and Six Sigma are both process improvement methodologies: 
• Lean is about speed and efficiency  
• Six Sigma is about precision and accuracy leading to data-driven decisions  
• Six Sigma will eliminate defects but it will not address the question of 
how to optimize process flow  
• Lean principles exclude the advanced statistical tools often required to 
achieve the process capabilities needed to be truly 'lean.  
                                                 
31Navy PPBE and a Programmatic and Budget View of POM08, July 2006, VADM Crenshaw Video 
Teleconference with NPS.  
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• Each approach can result in dramatic improvement, while utilizing both 
methods simultaneously holds the promise of being able to address all 
types of process problems with the most appropriate toolkit.  
• For example, inventory reduction not only requires reducing batch sizes 
and linking operations by using Lean, but also minimizing process 
variation by utilizing Six Sigma tools.32 
This new defense business transformation is now taking hold at all levels of DoD.  
 
Below are the six strategic Business Enterprise Priorities (BEPs) upon which the 
transformation is focused. 
• Personnel Visibility:  PV is focused on providing ready access to 
accurate, reliable, and timely personnel information for war-fighter 
mission planning.  This includes access to pay and benefits for DoD 
personnel and their dependents while ensuring the Combatant 
Commanders (COCOMs) have the same access to timely and accurate 
data on personnel and their individual skill sets.  This PV allows the way 
for combat readiness. 
• Acquisition Visibility:  AV is focused on providing an avenue as well as 
educating pertinent individuals to the acquisition information that is 
critical to supporting lifecycle management of the department’s processes 
which deliver weapon systems as well as automated information systems 
(such as ADNS).  The benefits of achieving AV are cost savings in 
consumables, manpower, and support elements. 
• Common Supplier Engagement:  CSE is focused on integrating and 
aligning policies, processes, data, technology, and people to standardize 
the process that DoD uses to conduct business with various suppliers 
including the different policies and procedures for commercial and 
government suppliers.  The benefits of CSE are that the war-fighter gets 
what they need to accomplish their mission without delays and without 
creating more work in the form of redundant reporting systems. 
• Materiel Visibility:  MV main focus is on the supply chain and its 
performance.  The benefit of MV is to provide timely and accurate 
information for the war-fighter as to the location, status, movement, and 
identity of materiel and supplies. 
• Real Property Accountability:  RPA is focused on informing DoD real-
time information on environmental, workforce, hazardous material, and 
real property assets of which there is legal interest.  The benefits of RPA 
are increased access to this valuable information at a reduced operational 
cost. 
                                                 
32 U.S. Army Material Command, Ready and Relevant with Lean Six Sigma. Lean Six Sigma Basics. 
http://www.amc.army.mil/lean/page.aspx?id=0 (October 2006). 
 29
• Financial Visibility:  FV is focused on providing access to accurate and 
timely financial information in order to enhance decision and policy 
makers.  One benefit of FV is to provide a standard for DoD Financial 
Managers (FMs) to use that will enable decision makers to make side-by-
side comparisons of programs for accurate evaluations.  Another benefit is 
to provide more financial responsibility which will hopefully result in an 
auditable DoD budget.33 
These areas of attention have the greatest potential for positive impacts on the 
Core Business Missions (CBMs) within DoD because they provide BEPs an increased 
ability to resolve basic questions about its operations (i.e. assets, investments, people and 
suppliers).  Each BEP has outlined measurable program and business capability 
achievements for the coming years.  These programs and goals provide improvement 
guidelines to each individual department’s business infrastructure, which benefits the 
war-fighter thru the integration of the enterprise business process.  This in turn reduces 
system redundancies which also improves the overall financials of DoD by eliminating 
programs that are not needed.34  The BEPs aid each department by focusing their 
attention and resources on areas that have the greatest impact on the enterprise as a 
whole, the biggest bang for your buck if you will.  It is also important to realize that 
BEPs need to be dynamic and allow for change while in the transformation stage.  
The BEP concept was introduced and implemented in September 2005.  Some of 
the successes since then have been that AV and RP met 100 percent of their milestones.  
Other successes have been accomplished through the implementation of the Enterprise 
Training Program (ETP).   
These successes include: 
• Personnel Visibility 
• Deployed a capability that allows real-time encounter 
documentation and enables retrieval of an electronic full medical 
record at the point of care. 
•  
                                                 
33 Defense Business Transformation, Business Enterprise Priorities. September 25, 2006. 
http://www.DoD.mil/dbt/priorities_beps.html (October 2006). 
34 Defense Business Transformation, Business Enterprise Priorities. September 28, 2006. 
http://www.DoD.mil/dbt/priorities_beps.html (October 2006). 
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• Acquisition Visibility 
• Released Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval 
(DAMIR) 2.2. 
• Achieved Full Operational Capability (FOC) with the 
implementation of USXPORTS V4.0 in January 2006. 
• Common Supplier Engagement 
• Provided an enterprise-wide view of sourcing data. 
• Deployed web-enabled Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) 
validations to ensure data integrity between DoD and the Internal 
Revenue Service. 
• Implemented first phase of automated contingency contracting 
capability (CC-SF44) for in-theater use. 
• Materiel Visibility 
• Completed initial military equipment valuations for 1,101 military 
equipment acquisitions programs. 
• Real Property Accountability 
• Achieved initial operating capability for the site Unique Identifier 
Registry (UID). 
• Financial Visibility 
• Integrated the Intergovernmental Transactions (IGT) reimbursable 
process model for intergovernmental transactions in the DEA 3.1. 
• Extended a common DoD financial language by incorporating 
Standard Financial Information Structure (SFIS) into “blueprints” 
for all emerging financial management systems and into 
certifications requirements for 29 existing systems. 
• Completed, ahead of schedule, Standard Fiscal Code complaint 
General Fund financial reporting capabilities for the Army and six 
Defense Agencies, which will enable over 78 million transactions 
per month to be posted to the corporate general ledger. 
• Established SFIS data library via web service capabilities for the 
DoD enterprise.35 
These examples provide evidence of the programs potential as well as guidelines 
for other enterprise systems such as NNFE to follow. 
                                                 
35 Defense Business Transformation, Business Enterprise Priorities. September 28, 2006. 
http://www.DoD.mil/dbt/priorities_beps.html (October 2006). 
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PEO C4I & Space has developed a FORCEnet Capability Plan or FCP in order to 
meet the requirements of the new NNFE model.  The goal of the FCP is to develop the 
FORCEnet Capability roadmap followed by the process and concluding with the 
application of the plans.  The focus of the initial FCP is on PR 09 with attention on the 
MDA and maintaining the course in order to meet the CNO’s goals for 2014.36  In the 
effort to meet the CNO enterprise approach, NNFE requires a unifying strategic 
capability framework.  This will be accomplished by the execution plan to ensure the 
NNFE product line delivers speed to the process.  This speed allows the war-fighter to 
receive the capability when needed, while maintaining effectiveness and efficiency.  The 
common capability framework will include:   
Common Framework Team (CFT) 1.  This team drives experimentation, technical 
insertion, Science and Technology (S&T), and long-term capability development.  CFT 2 
drives the requirements process.  CFT 3 provides the foundations for roadmaps and 
fielding plans. CFT 4 is the basis for resourcing, investment priorities, and POM 
portfolios.  Finally the Metrics Team is the key driver for NNFE domain, other PEO 
product lines and any mission area.37 
The critical assumption is in conjunction with SeaPower 21 and Joint Capability 
Areas (JCA) and is outlined in the chart below.  
 
                                                 
36Brief:  FORCEnet Capability Plan (FCP) and Development Process Decision Brief, NNFE 
Leadership Telecon, 10 July 2006. 
37Brief:  FORCEnet Capability Plan (FCP) and Development Process Decision Brief, NNFE 
Leadership Telecon, 10 July 2006. 
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After:  Brief:  FORCEnet Capability Plan (FCP) and Development Process Decision Brief, NNFE 
Leadership Telecon, 10 July 2006.  
Figure 8.   Critical Assumption for Common Analytical Framework 
 
Another assumption is that there are not any funds available for the FCP process 
and product development and that credibility of the FCP will be established in FY 07 that 
will allow for resources in FY 08.  Finally, FCP must influence capability developments 
(JCIDS, JCD&E), investment priorities (PPBE and S&T), and solution developments 
(acquisitions).38 
Some problems or issues have been identified that the current NNFE leadership 
are addressing.  They include how to bind the FCP process related to decision authority, 
how to determine which capability to align, planning and management timeframes, 
product format, and the development process.  While some of these decisions can and 
will be made within PEO C4I & Space, others will not.  For example, determining which 
                                                 
38Brief:  FORCEnet Capability Plan (FCP) and Development Process Decision Brief, NNFE 
Leadership Telecon, 10 July 2006. 
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capability to align to is extremely difficult.  The difficulty with this issue is that NNFE is 
concerned with systems and providing what they believe to be necessary for the war-
fighter.  However, this decision must be in concert with the goals of the CNO.  Without 
the full cooperation of Big Navy, it will be extremely difficult if not impossible to align 
the correct capabilities to the NNFE that will result in the desired outcome of the CNO.  
According to a representative of PEO C4I & Space, 
Currently, there is limited visibility into the other enterprise’s affairs.  Liaisons 
exist between the camps, but more attention is being applied to maturing the internal 
processes as opposed to reaching outward.  This outward interaction will happen as each 
of the enterprises mature.  Big Navy goals are distributed through vision/strategy papers 
and POM Serials, but the material is often too strategic in nature to be effectively applied 
to working level budgeting decisions.  The goal on the FORCEnet Capability 
Development Process (FCDP) and the supporting Common Analytical Framework is to 
provide a linkage between systems and strategic capabilities.39   
Below is a chart that poses the question of which is the correct approach to align 
capabilities.  
 
                                                 
39Email communication with representative of PEO C4I & Space, 19 September 2006. 
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• DOD JC2 & JNO Capability Portfolios?
• N61 POM 08 portfolios?
• PEO C4I programs and Roadmap?
• FORCEnet Functional Concept Capabilities?
• Joint Capability Areas (JCAs)
• Develop FORCEnet Initial Capabilities Document 
 After:  Brief:  FORCEnet Capability Plan (FCP) and Development Process Decision Brief, NNFE 
Leadership Telecon, 10 July 2006. 
 
Figure 9.   Determining Which Capabilities to Align 
 
B. SUMMARY 
 As stated earlier, it is the decision of the leadership to maintain NNFE to align 
with the CNO’s vision and to align with the JCAs.  Therefore, in order for the NNFE 
process to be successful in its current form it is vital that CFT 2 maintain a close working 
relationship with JCAs and SeaPower 21 along with the CNO’s staff to maintain the 
alignment of current requirements.  This team leader is the gatekeeper to the remaining 
teams at PEO C4I & Space.  As events unfold and priorities shift, this team needs to be in 
the loop to advise the remaining teams within NNFE of future problems and concerns.  
This team also needs to make policy makers aware of the cost of changes in priorities as 
well as time gaps in full-filling requirements if they change.  For these reasons, it is 
important that CFT 2 own a piece of the FCP according to timeframe (years 3-7) of the 
plan.  Other problems that are likely to arise from using the enterprise or business model 
are that of accountability and incentives.  These areas will be discussed further later in 
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this study, but suffice it to say that historically, DoD employees, specifically active duty 
military, rarely stay in a job or position long enough to see a project completely through 
to completion and fielding or deployment.  This results in lack of ownership and 
responsibility for the continued success of a program.  On the other hand, DoD civilians 
are in positions for longer periods of time and will most likely see a project through the 
entire process.  The issue that needs to be addressed is keeping people on projects 
throughout the projects lifecycle.  This is the only way to create ownership of a program, 
thereby creating the ability to hold someone personally accountable for the success or 
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IV. ADNS WITHIN NNFE 
A. PROGRAM AND ENVIRONMENT 
An important distinction must be noted between applications of FCP to existing 
programs versus future programs.  ADNS is an example of an existing program that must 
adapt to the enterprise construct.  We attempt to identify potential problems in budgeting 
and funding for ADNS within the partially constructed enterprise framework and FCP 
processes.  Future capability requirements will be generated that must be funded within 
NNFE, taking into account existing programs.  We will assess whether FCP can provide a 
seamless link between the program based, calendar driven PPBES and the capability 
based, milestone driven JCIDS. 
As stated earlier, ADNS is an ACAT III program.  This means that there is not as 
much attention given in the budget process to this program category as to that of an 
ACAT I program (For more information concerning ACAT levels see chapter I).  It is 
important to keep in mind that although ADNS is categorized as a lower echelon program 
and is not as expensive as many other programs, it is important to Navy acquisition and 
to PEO C4I & Space.  This is due to its large role in accomplishing the capability desired 
for the fleet in 2014.  In order to achieve the desired end-state, ADNS must make 
successful use of the system in which it must perform (NNFE).  Failure to do so will 
result in the reduction of funding for the program.  For this reason the FCP must be 
constantly monitored and improved as the dynamics of the budgeting process evolve.  
This evolution includes the Transition to Industry Performers (TIP) concept which 
enables best value options by rewarding industry innovations.  It also stresses 
performance based strategies for acquisitions, maximizes the use of common C4I 
equipment, and allows for interoperability.40   
The PM for ADNS will need to ensure that the program has representatives from 
each of the four Capability Function Teams (CFT).  In addition, each CFT must be fully 
                                                 
40Brief:  SPAWAR-Industry Executive Network (SIEN), 18 September 2006, Chris Miller, Acting 
PEO C4I. 
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integrated and work as a cohesive team.  In other words, each must be kept aware of the 
actions of the other.  This will aid in the achievement of the objectives of the FCP which 
is:  to align the NNFE process to a common capability framework, unity of effort.41  This 
unity of effort emphasizes the importance of the FCP.   
NNFE requires a unifying strategic capability framework, management, and 
execution plan to ensure NNFE product line delivers speed to capability, effectiveness 
and efficiency.42  By utilizing this unity of effort, FCP should be able to influence JCIDS, 
PPBES, and the entire acquisition process.   
Another issue that arises is that the CFT leaders are generally more senior than the 
individual PM {depending on ACAT category of program}, but it is still the PM’s 
responsibility to keep the unity.  While all CFT leaders have other programs to manage, 
each PM will inevitably have to convince each CFT leader of the importance of his/her 
program.  As mentioned earlier, CFT 2 will be the gatekeeper between PEO C4I & Space 
programs and those driving the requirements.  Therefore, there will be a lot of strain and 
pressure on the PM of ADNS to make sure that CFT 2 leader has ADNS on the top of 
his/her list.  Due to these factors, our research presumes that business politics will 
become a factor in this already convoluted process.   
Another major concern for this business enterprise model is that of turnover.  
Since the beginning of this research project {March 2006), there have been at least three 
different individuals who have had the led or have held the position of acquisition 
director under PEO C4I & Space.  This is typical in a military command; however this 
shifting of personnel has drastic effects on the unity and synergy of an organization, 
which is so desperately sought after.  This phenomenon is quite different than that of the 
corporate world in which DoD acquisitions is attempting to model.  For example, it is 
extremely rare for someone to start a project and see it through until completion within 
the DoD acquisition community.  While the corporate world hires and fires strictly on the 
                                                 
41Brief:  FORCEnet Capability Plan (FCP) and Development Process Decision Brief, NNFE 
Leadership Telecon, 10 July 2006. 
42Brief:  FORCEnet Capability Plan (FCP) and Development Process Decision Brief, NNFE 
Leadership Telecon, 10 July 2006. 
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basis of someone’s successes or failures, this is not the case in government.  DoD’s 
current strategy ignores lack of ownership and responsibility problems which are the 
norm is DoD acquisition.  Without being able to hold anyone accountable, the business 
model will be ineffective.  The top level figures of the business model are easy to 
duplicate and accountability can somewhat be managed before a turnover is undertaken.  
However, to truly be successful at all echelons, each member must have the same 
expectations and timeline to see a program through the process, whether it is a success or 
a failure. Then and only then, can corrective actions and ownership of a program take 
effect.  
According to the Department of the Navy Information Technology Magazine, the 
new NNFE system is set up to mock that of private business.43  To do this will require 
effective implementation of the concept of Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO), and Chief Operations Officer (COO) to be implemented in the 
Navy system. 
The Naval Network Warfare Command, or NETWARCOM, which represents 
war-fighters who rely on C4I systems to accomplish their missions, is the CEO.  The 
CEO prioritizes and integrates requirements from the fleet and identifies optimum current 
and future readiness levels.  The CFO role is fulfilled by OPNAV, which evaluates the 
financial soundness of programs and develops financial plans to support war-fighting 
priorities.  As FORCEnet’s chief engineer, SPAWAR fulfills the COO role by aligning 
the processes by which the joint, interoperable architecture is designed. This role requires 
extensive collaboration with the Navy’s acquisition community, which includes partner 
program executive offices and ASN RDA.44 
 
 
                                                 
43 CHIPS - The Department of the Navy Information Technology Magazine. New SPAWAR 
Commander Outlines Near, Long-Range Goals. CHIPS April - June 2006, by Steve Davis. 
http://www.chips.navy.mil/archives/06_apr/web_pages/RADM_Bachmann.htm (October 2006). 
44 CHIPS - The Department of the Navy Information Technology Magazine. New SPAWAR 
Commander Outlines Near, Long-Range Goals. CHIPS April - June 2006, by Steve Davis. 
http://www.chips.navy.mil/archives/06_apr/web_pages/RADM_Bachmann.htm (October 2006). 
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B. CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS  
Success of ADNS is dependent upon funding.  Although this statement is straight-
forward and simple, funding for ADNS must be a priority of the CEO, CFO, and COO 
concept of the business enterprise model.  For this reason it is important to relate the 
importance of ADNS and its vitality to those items of interest of the JCA, Sea power 21, 
and the CNO.  According to the SPAWAR brief on 18 September 2006, the Navy Fleet’s 
top 10 priority list is as follows: 
• Coalition and Multinational C4 Interoperability 
• Reliable Satellite Communication 
• Data Throughput 
• Computer Network Defense 
• Common Operational Picture (COP)/Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) 
• Real-time Collaboration 
• Standards Based on Information Technology Service Management (ITSM) 
Best Practices 
• Streamlined Administrative C4 Processes 
• C4 Training 
• War-fighting Network Sustainment and Life Cycle Management45 
With this list to guide as a priority for funding, the CFTs and PM for ADNS 
should exploit the multiple areas in which ADNS can address and satisfy these priorities.  
These areas must be fully detailed and explained to the CEO, CFO, and COO by either 
the PM or the CFTs to accurately employ the business enterprise model. This point 
emphasizes the magnitude of the interaction and knowledge sharing that must take place 
within a corporation.  The same definitely must be adapted to the acquisition process if 
the business model of efficiency and effectiveness is truly the goal.   
A final aspect that must be considered is that of the external influence of the 
organization.  For instance, the CEO must maintain the support of his/her stakeholders to 
keep the position.  The same can probably be assumed with regard to DoD acquisition 
                                                 
45Brief:  SPAWAR-Industry Executive Network (SIEN), 18 September 2006, Chris Miller, Acting 
PEO C4I. 
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and the political arena.  As a point, ADNS is an older and relatively inexpensive system 
(in relation to the ACAT levels).  Because ADNS is an incremental development system 
it is able to provide the most current and state-of-the-art technology to be installed on 
ships, aircraft, and shore sites.  Due to the goals or priorities of the fleet, a logical 
solution and arguably the best solution is ADNS.  But what happens when political 
agendas creep in?  One could argue that when “pork” (See chapter I) or other peripheral 
influences take effect, the best solution does not always win out.  This example could be 
expressed in the enterprise system of when the stakeholders put pressure on the CEO to 
conduct business and make decisions that may not result in the best interest of a 
particular department within the business, i.e. ADNS.  How would the enterprise business 
model adapt to this type of scenario? Would bureaucracy take hold once again, which 
would result in the same old slow down in the process that we are use to?  This seems to 
be the case, especially when we see an example of an expedited process to JCIDS that 
deals with big dollar items (ACAT I programs).  Is this really the need of the COCOM? 
Or is it there to satisfy a congressman or his/her constituents? 
 
C. POTENTIAL FOR EXPEDITED PROGRAM 
Recently, there has been a push from the top levels of DoD acquisition to expedite 
the JCIDS process in an effort to provide a needed capability to the war-fighter.  The 
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) is such a program that is receiving attention with 
hopes of getting this product through the process and in the hands of the war-fighters in 
an expedited manner.  To achieve this the  
Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO) must define the roles, 
responsibilities, and authorities of Department of Defense (DoD) 
organizations involved in the JTRS program, to include acquisition 
management, technical, fiscal, managerial, and personnel resourcing 
aspects of the program.  Second is to establish a new governance model 
that will outline the decision-making process for JTRS.  The model must 
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address the need for greater agility and efficiency, while encompassing 
stakeholder concerns.46   
The tenets of the JTRS governance process will be to: 
a.  Adequately address the requirements, technology development, 
and budget processes as an integrated whole. 
b.  Ensure efficient decision-making at appropriate levels, and provide 
for an efficient review and coordination cycle process. 
c.  Allow entry into the decision process when readiness is “in sight”. 
d.  Reduce resource requirements and effectively manage risk in the 
development process consistent with program objectives and 
relationships to overall department capabilities.47   
If JTRS can be expeditiously processed through the current DoD acquisition system, why 
can’t other programs? What sets JTRS apart from ADNS, other than its ACAT category?  
The outline below indicates the objectives and measurements of the new JTRS process. 
• Objective:




Time from PM sign to final approval (new process) X 100
Time from PM sign to final approval (old process)
– Method Data Obtained: Through JTRS Governance 
execution.  Old process baseline is the average time to staff 
various ACAT I/IA/II documents.
– Number of Measures: Acquisition Strategy, TEMP, APB, 
and “CCA Package” time to approval
– Goal:  < 85%
– Reporting Frequency: Each Milestone decision
 
After:  Brief:  Joint Program Executive Office, Joint Tactical Radio System Draft Acquisition 
Streamlining Process Brief. May 2006. 
Figure 10.   JTRS as an Expedited Acquisition Process 
                                                 
46DoD Memorandum:  Department of Defense, Acquisition & Logistics. Under Secretary of Defense, 
1 August 2006, Memorandum for:  JTRS. Subj:  Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Terms of Reference & 
Governance Porcess. Hon. Kenneth J. Krieg. 
47DoD Memorandum:  Department of Defense, Acquisition & Logistics. Under Secretary of Defense, 
1 August 2006, Memorandum for:  JTRS. Subj:  Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Terms of Reference & 
Governance Porcess. Hon. Kenneth J. Krieg. 
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The JTRS program has experienced success in navigating the acquisition process, 
but there is more to this story.  The DoD focus on expedited acquisition processes for 
JTRS may come at the expense of program performance.  Since the start of JTRS Cluster 
1, the program has experienced an estimated 31 percent growth in development cost, and 
a 44 percent schedule growth.  At the same time, a mere 28 percent of design drawings 
were complete at the Design Readiness Review, and none of the technology had reached 
the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of 6, the level at which DoD considers 
technology "mature."  It is important to note that the JTRS program did not go through a 
formal JCIDS Milestone "A" review, instead entering the acquisition process directly into 
Milestone "B."48  It would appear that the JTRS program expedited their acquisition 
processes at the expense of program performance.  Several lessons can be inferred as a 
result of problems encountered by JTRS that may serve as a lesson for programs such as 
ADNS. 
The problems experienced by JTRS highlights a significant disconnect between 
JCIDS and PPBES.  The JTRS program originated through the JCIDS process, with 
promise to provide a jointly born capability that is a high priority for DoD.  As a joint 
program office (JPO), funding in effect comes from the services.  Despite the critical 
need for JTRS, the JPO must still validate its need for funding like any other program.  
Recall that in PPBES, funding is appropriated to Program Elements via the services.  The 
faster programs can advance within JCIDS, the greater chance they have of full funding, 
given the calendar driven nature of PPBES.  In the race to get funded faster, it is 
conceivable that the JTRS program raced through the acquisition process without regard 
to impacts on program performance.  Once funded, it would likely take more than poor 
cost and schedule performance to kill a high priority ACAT I program.  This is a trap that 
the program manager for ADNS, as well as PEO/C4I Space, may want to avoid when 
working within NNFE. 
The issues experienced by the JTRS program also exposes disconnects between 
goals of the program manager and those of senior leaders.  Success for the program 
                                                 
48 U.S. Government Accountability Office.  Defense Acquisitions:  Major Weapon Systems Continue 
to Experience Cost and Schedule Problems Under DoD's Revised Policy.  (April 2006).  GAO-06-368. 
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manager is defined simply as obtaining funding for their program.  As far as most 
program managers are concerned, their program is the best solution to fill the capability 
gap. 
 
D. PROGRAM RISKS 
The risks associated with ADNS assessed within the NNFE process should be 
thoroughly considered.  Due to ADNS being installed around the fleet for over a decade, 
it is understandable how the PM for ADNS would be hesitant of this new business 
approach, thinking that a more jointly born program would be selected over ADNS.  
However, if risks are properly managed and are weighed correctly, this business process 
will prove to be no more risky.  The charts below describe an example; the risk 
assessment for ADNS for submarines and options for POM 08, which are managing 














Full Funding of Target Inventory Objective 
for ADNS Increment III for all Designated 
Surface and Submarine Platforms.
Denies SIPR, NIPR, SI, Coalition access to 
Submarine Community – relegates 
Submarine Platforms to legacy 
communications and denies the capability 





INC III FOR SUBMARINES
FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13
10.0 16.1 14.3 10.1 5.0 3.7
FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13
0 0 0 0 0 0
Option #1: Fully Fund INC III for Submarines





















After:  Brief:  Net-Centric Warfare (N-71) POM-08 Program Review//Automated Digital Network 
System (ADNS)//Robert Bradley/NC71C118, 1 December 2005. 


































Invest Recoup 2 2
2 5
Warfighting Risk 1 6
Warfighting Capability Risk
1-2 - Little to no-risk; warfighting unaffected
3-4 - Low risk, minor impact to routine non-combat operations/deployments
5-6 - Medium risk, degraded operations, increased loss of SSNs and SC, and 
increased A/C attrition, but little risk to campaign outcome
7-8 - High risk, loss of capital ship(s), significant A/C attrition, significant 
degradation to operations, campaign outcome at-risk
9-10 - Grave risk, major degradation to operations,  campaign likely lost
Feasibility Factors – (Additive)
Legislative or Regulatory
0: No legislative, regulatory, or service hurdles to overcome 
1: Notification required, but minimum opposition expected 
2: Significant changes to law or regulation required
Political      0: Minimum or no political interest 
1: Minor staffing or testimony anticipated 
2: Significant political opposition anticipated
Complexity 0: No perceived hazards due to degree of complexity
1: Mitigation somewhat complex
2: Mitigation very complex
Intangible   0: Minimum or none known
1: Potential impact on public image or morale of force. Uncertainty re: savings 
potential
2: Impact on public image or morale of force likely. Great uncertainty regarding 
savings
Investment Recoupment
0: No investment required or is immediately self financing
1: Investment recoverable in two years
2: Significant investment is required  and is not recoverable in two years
INC III FOR SUBMARINES
 
After:  Brief:  Net-Centric Warfare (N-71) POM-08 Program Review//Automated Digital Network 
System (ADNS)//Robert Bradley/NC71C118, 1 December 2005. 
Figure 12.   Risk Comparison of POM 2008  
 
E. SUMMARY 
When using the enterprise business model, the assigned weight factors must be 
analyzed.  Weight factors must account for options that PEO may choose to fulfill in 
place of ADNS.  By accurately adding these determination factors to the mix, the same 
type of risk comparison can be achieved as indicated in Figure 12.  It must be noted that 
for the business model or enterprise system to be effective and efficient, the best choice is 
that which is best for the organization and not just the best choice for the program under 
consideration. The following chapter will provide specific analysis of ADNS within the 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 47
V. ANALYSIS OF ADNS WITHIN NNFE 
A. FORCENET CAPABILITY PLAN (FCP) 
To summarize, the FORCENET Capability Plan (FCP) is a key component in the 
transition to NNFE.  The goals of FCP are:   
• Align NNFE processes to a common capability framework 
• Be scaleable and extensible to include larger NNFE domain, other PEO 
product lines and any mission area 
• Support near, mid and far term planning and programming 
• Integrate, synchronize and deconflict existing NNFE products and 
processes49 
In developing the FCP, PEO C4I/Space leadership encountered problems with the 
following:   
• To which capabilities to align NNFE 
• The FCP process in terms of authorities and scope for the initial effort  
• Planning and management timeframes for FCP  
• The development process of FCP 
• The FCP product format50   
The first goal, alignment of NNFE processes to a common capability framework, 
is arguably the most important.  As stated in the problem identification, a common 
definition of capability across the enterprise is lacking.  If the ultimate goal of capabilities 
based budgeting is better investment decisions that maximize marginal value, then the 
enterprise must know what it is getting, and how much it costs.  Most stakeholders within 
DoD have strong incentives to make and accept estimates that are unreasonably low.  The 
common thinking is that a program that overruns its budget can "get well" later.  
Assessment of NNFE will follow with the assumption that other issues in the list above 
have been resolved.   
                                                 
49 Brief:  FORCEnet Capability Plan (FCP) and Development Process Decision Brief, NNFE 
Leadership Telecon, 10 July 2006. 
50Brief:  FORCEnet Capability Plan (FCP) and Development Process Decision Brief, NNFE 
Leadership Telecon, 10 July 2006. 
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An important distinction must be noted between applications of FCP to existing 
programs versus future programs.  ADNS is an example of an existing program that must 
adapt to the enterprise construct.  We attempt to identify potential problems in budgeting 
and funding for ADNS within the partially constructed enterprise framework and FCP 
processes.  Future capability requirements will be generated that must be funded within 
NNFE, taking into account existing programs.  We will assess whether FCP can provide a 
link between the program based, calendar driven PPBES and the capability based, 
milestone driven JCIDS.  Implications for capabilities based budgeting are assessed. 
 
B. ADNS SUCCESS WITHIN NNFE 
Before discussion of how the ADNS program can succeed within NNFE, it is 
noted that success is defined differently among stakeholders.  For example, war fighters 
want capability fast, program managers want funding for their programs, DoD senior 
leaders want smarter investment decisions, and Congress wants jobs in their district.  The 
PEO and higher level stakeholders have expressed interest in more effective investment 
decisions that maximize marginal benefit across the portfolio of programs.  For this, 
success means that ADNS is accurately broken down in terms of capability and 
incorporated into the enterprise framework.  Budgeting decision makers may then address 
program funding requirements accurately, getting the appropriate amount of capability 
for the funds invested.  The program manager is likely less concerned about the 
enterprise.  The goal of the program manager is to obtain funding for the program so that 
the program can be executed, but that is where it ends.  The program manager already 
knows that the capability provided fills the need. 
The underlying assumption is that success for ADNS is defined as adequate 
funding to successfully execute a program that provides timely capabilities aligned with 
enterprise needs.  Given the definition of success, general keys to being successful within 
NNFE are proposed: 
• Align and articulate capabilities provided by ADNS with the enterprise 
construct 
• Seek advocacy from users, resource officers, and other stakeholders 
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• Emphasize current and past success, and quantify where possible 
• Do not rush the program through milestone decisions at the expense of 
successful program execution 
The first key to success for ADNS is to align and articulate the capabilities 
provided by the program with the common capability framework established by 
implementation of NNFE.  This is essentially a marketing and sales function, and is 
nothing new as program managers and resource officers already advocate their programs 
in a similar manner.  NNFE merely changes the manner is which stakeholders will 
advertise and sell their programs. 
The ability to point to a fielded asset and explain why more is needed makes a 
compelling argument for additional funding.  Since ADNS is an established program that 
has successfully fielded incremental capabilities, it is seemingly easy to justify continued 
funding for the program.  Regardless, even successful programs continually defend their 
funding.  Demonstrated success of a fielded system is helpful, but does not guarantee cuts 
in funding. 
Accelerating a program through the acquisition process is a risky endeavor.  It is 
tempting for a program manager to do this for two reasons.  First, progress through 
JCIDS is widely viewed as a measure of success for a program.  Programs that get 
through milestone decisions are more likely to receive funding.  The other reason relates 
to accountability.  Excessive oversight that does not empower program management 
decisions and short tenures for program managers make it unlikely that the program 
manager will have to deal with the consequences of their decisions.  Potential solutions to 
this paradox are to increase rigor in the JCIDS milestone decision process, or change 
incentives for program managers, possible through longer tenure or empowerment to 
make better decisions.  Given the significant change in approach for ADNS Increment III 
to contractor development, care should be taken to ensure requirements are properly 





By most measures, ADNS is a relatively successful legacy program. The program 
has successfully delivered capability to war fighters within cost and schedule goals. The 
program will likely continue to succeed despite a shift to a Navy enterprise framework.  
This indicates one shortfall of NNFE in facilitating capabilities based budgeting that is 




VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR CAPABILITIES BASED BUDGETING 
A. NNFE ONLY A PARTIAL SOLUTION 
DoD and the Department of the Navy are working toward capabilities based 
budgeting via an enterprise construct.  PEO C4I/Space is in the process of organizing the 
budget process around NNFE and a common capability framework.  A common 
capability framework is a necessary component for capabilities based budgeting, but it is 
not the only required component, nor does it address a number of key obstacles to a true 
capabilities based budgeting system.  The other critical requirement is accurate cost 
estimation, which suffers as a result of problems identified at the start of research, such as 
misalignment of stakeholder objectives, lack of metrics for investment effectiveness, and 
disconnects between JCIDS and PPBES.  Successful program execution also suffers as a 
result.  NNFE fails to address these issues, and more work will likely be required to 
further develop the enterprise model until it is fully adopted at all levels and addresses 
deficiencies. 
The most significant contribution of NNFE toward capabilities based budgeting 
will be the creation of a common capability framework.  This framework will not be 
perfect, nor does it need to be.  A common capability framework may be successful if it 
meets the following criteria: 
• Gets buy-in from stakeholders at all levels 
• Retains flexibility for urgent or unanticipated capability requirements 
Stakeholder buy-in is important because lack of stakeholder advocacy would be an 
insurmountable obstacle.  Congress, Services, program managers and end users all have 
varying goals for a weapon system, and a common capability framework that meets all 
goals does not exist.  In this case, a 70 to 80 percent solution may work well, provided 
the common capability framework maintains enough flexibility to be adjusted in response 
to more urgent war fighter needs that weren't fully anticipated.  Periodic reviews would 
almost certainly be required, but this may not be enough to overcome misalignment of 
enterprise goals. 
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Although the ADNS program is likely to succeed within the NNFE framework, 
NNFE will likely not be an effective link or "crosswalk" between JCIDS and PPBES.  
NNFE may succeed in driving a common definition of capability that is required for 
smarter investment decisions, but it falls short in addressing other root causes of program 
and budgeting problems.  Specifically, NNFE does not: 
• Change incentives for key stakeholders, primarily program managers 
• Streamline or reduce oversight 
• Readily provide metrics for measuring investment effectiveness 
• Increase accountability by reducing turnover 
NNFE does not significantly change incentives for program managers.  Obtaining 
funding for their respective programs is still the top goal, and program managers will not 
be dissuaded from the belief that their programs are the best solution for capability gaps.  
In response to NNFE, program managers will likely find a way to make their program fit 
within the new framework in whatever manner best attracts funding.  New programs that 
start within NNFE and do not provide redundant capability within the common capability 
framework will also do well in receiving funds. 
Once legacy and new program leadership have figured out how to navigate 
NNFE, the race for funding is on.  Programs are still funded within the calendar driven 
PPBES, program managers want to get their programs established, and high turnover of 
program managers makes accountability difficult, if not impossible.  Overhauling the 
military personnel system to leave program managers in place and provide incentives for 
good long-term program performance may be cost prohibitive, but changing policy to 
require more stringent milestone decision reviews may be easier to implement.  If 
program managers are required to demonstrate critical technologies, present a detailed 
life-cycle logistics plan, or answer detailed production questions, they may think twice 
before rushing their program to a milestone decision.  No matter the solution chosen, it is 
important to get the goals of program managers in line with enterprise goals.  Of course, 
program managers are not the only stakeholders. 
Significant oversight exists in the acquisition process, and program managers do 
not have final say in program milestone decisions.  Figure 13 provides an illustration of 
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the many stakeholders involved in the process.  One goal of NNFE would be to move 
toward the streamlined, corporate model in the upper left of the figure.  This may not be 
possible for a variety of reasons.  A great deal of funding resources are at stake, 
stakeholders would be unwilling to give up their respective roles in the process, and 
existing laws would have to be abolished or re-written to accommodate a move to a more 
streamlined oversight process. 
 
 
After:  U.S. Government Accountability Office.  Best Practices:  Better Support of Weapon System 
Program Managers Needed to Improve Outcomes.  (November 2005).  GAO-06-110. 
Figure 13.   Commercial vs. DoD Oversight Environments 
 
Collection of accurate metrics for investment effectiveness will be difficult within 
NNFE.  The enterprise must carefully consider their choice of metrics.  For example, a 
program may get a favorable Milestone B decision, giving the perception that a program 
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is successfully executing.  If progress through JCIDS is the metric, then this is a good 
investment.  A year later, the program runs significantly behind schedule and over cost, 
perhaps falling prey to the JTRS trap.  Progress through JCIDS may not be an accurate 
reflection of true program progress.  Earned Value Management may be a better metric, 
but is still not a perfect barometer of actual program performance.   
It is possible that capability requirements may change, also affecting investment 
priorities.  Once a program is funded, it may be difficult to reverse a poor decision.  In 
PPBES, programs are more visible than capabilities.  Senior DoD leaders and members 
of Congress still view individual programs in the context of PPBES.  These more senior 
level stakeholders may be reluctant to allow the Navy to reverse a bad investment, 
whether due to a change in capabilities required or a poorly executed program.  It is not 
clear that these possibilities have been considered in development of NNFE.  This leads 
into the question of whether NNFE will be an effective link between JCIDS and PPBES. 
 
B. NNFE AS LINK BETWEEN JCIDS AND PPBES 
As DoD and the Navy continue to develop an enterprise construct with a goal of 
capabilities based budgeting, future programs that are born of capabilities-based planning 
will be integrated with existing programs based upon a common capability framework.  
Figures 14 and 15 illustrate where NNFE is expected to fit within JCIDS and PPBES.  
Figure 14 displays where NNFE integrates with the calendar driven PPBES at the 
OPNAV level.  Figure 15 details the FCP, pending final approval.  The most substantive 
changes illustrated seem to reside almost entirely within the JCIDS process.  While the 
input to the programming process is changed, and capability plans are considered 
throughout, PPBES is not impacted.  Funding is still based on programs, even if they are 
better aligned in terms of capabilities.  The budget process is still largely calendar driven, 
while execution continues in a milestone framework.  Even if the right mix of capabilities 
is funded, program execution is not any more certain under the new framework.  The 
probability of successful program execution is an important factor in making investment 
decisions that maximize marginal value.  
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Brief:  NNFE FCP - OPNAV Integration, 4 Aug 2006 





Brief:  NNFE FCP - OPNAV Integration, 4 Aug 2006 
Figure 15.   Proposed FCP Process 
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Figure 14 illustrates how FCP relates to PPBES.  It would appear that FCP merely 
reorganizes requirements generation; programming, budgeting, and execution processes 
remain essentially unchanged.  In the coming years, as new programs come on line and 
legacy programs reach the end of the life cycle, investments in programs should be better 
aligned with capabilities.  In effect, budgeting would be based on capabilities, but this 
does not necessarily mean that investment decisions will result in maximization of 
marginal value, or that programs will be executed more efficiently. 
Figure 15 illustrates the proposed FCP process.  Of particular interest here is 
Phase 3 - Program Adjustments.  This is where the POM is realigned to account for 
changes in capability requirements, gets submitted, and budget decisions are returned.  
Phase 4 - Fielding and Transition then illustrates fielding of capabilities either through 
DOTMLPF or JCIDS.  If successful program execution is to be a factor in investment 
decisions, it would seem that an iterative feedback loop should be inserted that flows 
back to the POM process.  This raises an interesting question.  Assuming capabilities are 
perfectly aligned, and programs are established that are not redundant, does this create 
increased risk if a program fails to execute and is subsequently canceled?  The question is 
not within the scope of this research, but does highlight the importance of successful 
program execution as a factor for investment decision making. 
 
C. NOTIONAL DECISION SUPPORT MODEL 
A decision support model to aid in investment decision making would be 
extremely difficult given the relative immaturity of NNFE and the core issues identified 
by this study.  To provide perspective on the challenge, it may be useful to consider the 
Bowl Championship Series (BCS) format in NCAA Division IA football.  The goal of 
that system is seemingly simple:  match the two best teams in college football in a 
championship game at the end of the season.  However, the resulting match-ups since 
inception of the system nine years ago are widely viewed as controversial.  Much like a 
common definition of capability, a common definition of what makes a football team the 
best out of 117 NCAA Division IA programs is lacking.  Stakeholder goals are 
misaligned with the enterprise goal of matching the two best teams, similar to 
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misalignment of goals within defense acquisitions.  The enterprise goal of a one versus 
two match-up conflicts with the monetary incentives of conferences, television networks, 
and bowl game organizers.  In defense acquisitions, Total Obligation Authority is 
sometimes coveted by stakeholders despite what is best for the defense enterprise.  The 
BCS continues to evolve after nine years of failure to accomplish a simple goal, and it 
will continue to fail because the core issues have not been resolved.   
This is illustrative of the problem in producing a decision support model for 
investment decisions within NNFE.  Needless to say, goals associated with better 
investment decisions across a large enterprise raise the level of difficulty exponentially.  
It is possible to describe a notional model, provided the problems identified are resolved.  
Following are proposed requirements for a notional model: 
• Stable capability requirements derived from a common framework 
• Realistic cost estimates 
• Accurate measures of program progress 
This is a tall order. Assuming these requirements could be fulfilled, enterprise 
stakeholders will have to agree on priorities for capabilities.  This is another tall order.  
Given the relative immaturity of NNFE implementation, unresolved core issues, and the 
overall complexity of defense acquisition, a comprehensive investment decision support 
model is simply not feasible at this time. 
 
D. SUMMARY 
NNFE effectively moves the enterprise toward a common capability framework.  
At present, NNFE does not provide useful metrics, streamline oversight, align 
stakeholder incentives, or increase accountability for investment decisions.  Until these 
fundamental issues are resolved, an investment decision support model is not feasible.  




A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The purpose of the project is to better understand ADNS, NNFE, and the goals of 
the enterprise system.  Following development of this background information and 
projecting how ADNS is likely to succeed in the NNFE framework, two fundamental 
research questions were addressed.  The first question:  Does the enterprise system reduce 
the discrepancies between PPBES and the acquisition decision process for both budgeting 
and defense asset acquisition? The second question is to what extent the discrepancies 
and resulting problems discovered during this research project be resolved to improve 
national defense budgeting within NNFE and asset acquisition decision effectiveness in 
DoD? 
Within the context of JCIDS, PPBES, and the acquisition system as a whole, 
some core issues have been identified that are obstacles to sound investment decisions.  
Problems identified include: 
• No common definition for capability 
• Lack of metrics for investment effectiveness 
• Stakeholders misalignment with enterprise 
• Competition between programs 
• Turnover and accountability 
Recent efforts have been undertaken by the Navy to organize within an enterprise 
construct in order to make smarter investment decisions, moving toward true capabilities 
based budgeting.  Programs within the PEO C4I/Space portfolio fall under the Naval 
Netwar FORCEnet Enterprise (NNFE), and the organization is working toward 
compliance with the Navy initiative. 
It is likely that programs such as ADNS will succeed within the NNFE 
framework.  However, NNFE at present does little to address the problems identified.  
NNFE will force stakeholders to focus on and develop a common capability framework, 
but this is only a partial enabler of capabilities based budgeting.  NNFE does not account 
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for over-optimistic cost estimates, and does not address the root causes which include 
misalignment of enterprise goals among stakeholders, lack of accountability for 
underperforming programs, and disconnects between JCIDS and PPBES.  Over time, 
NNFE may result in programs that are essentially "capabilities based," but this does not 
equate to better execution of programs or maximization of marginal value. 
A notional decision support model is discussed, but implementation is not feasible 
until underlying system deficiencies have been resolved.  More study is needed to 




In general, the problems encountered during research are large and complex.  It is 
very unlikely that a "silver bullet" solution exists to the question of budgeting for 
capabilities.  However, stakeholders at various levels within the enterprise may be able to 
judiciously apply business strategy and some corporate best practices in mitigating 
impacts resulting from the issues identified. 
Ultimately, it is unclear whether NNFE will provide a framework for better 
investment decisions based on capabilities that maximize marginal value.  
Implementation of NNFE carries significant implications for capabilities based 
budgeting, and appears to be moving the enterprise toward a common capabilities 
framework.  While NNFE presently falls short in some respects, the process is very 
immature, and impacts of implementation may not be fully realized until programs have 
been given time to work within the framework. 
 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
During research, the following questions were identified that were beyond the 
scope of this research, but may be potential candidates for further research to improve 
acquisition investment decisions. 
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• Correlation between an expedited acquisition process and effective 
program execution. Are programs that speed through the milestone 
process at risk for poor cost and schedule performance in the long-run? 
• What are the appropriate investment metrics for determining return on 
investment in defense acquisitions? 
• How should a common capability framework be developed? 
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